감사시간과 감사보수가 이익조정에 미치는 영향 (The Effect of Audit Hours and Audit Fees on Earnings Management)

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 한국회계학회
· 수록지 정보 : 회계학연구 / 31권 / 4호 / 175 ~ 202페이지
· 저자명 : 권수영, 정재연, 신현걸

초록

본 연구는 감사인이 Big4와 제휴관계에 있는지의 여부가 이익조정에 직접적으로 영향을 미칠 뿐만 아니라 감사시간과 감사보수를 통해 간접적으로도 이익조정에 영향을 미칠 수 있음을 고려하였다. 이러한 설정에서 이익조정의 대용치인 재량적발생액 이외에도 감사시간과 감사보수도 내생적 변수이기 때문에 구조방정식 모형 (structural equation model)을 이용하여 분석하였다.
실증분석 결과 감사인의 규모와 감사시간 간에는 유의한 상관관계가 존재하지만, 감사인의 규모와 초과감사시간 간에는 유의한 상관관계가 존재하지 않았다. 이러한 결과는 Big 감사인이라고 해서 적정감사시간을 초과하는 감사시간을 투입하지는 않음을 보여주는 것이다. 또한 감사인의 규모, 감사시간 및 감사보수와의 분석을 통해서 Big 감사인이라고 해서 더 많은 감사보수를 청구한다기 보다는 적정시간을 초과하는 감사시간에 대한 보상으로 더 많은 감사보수를 청구하고 있다는 증거를 발견하였다. 마지막으로 감사시간은 이익조정과 유의한 상관관계가 존재하지 않았으나, 초과감사시간은 이익조정과 유의한 상관관계가 존재하는 것으로 나타나 적정감사시간 이상의 노력을 기울일 때 이익조정이 억제된다는 것을 발견하였다.
본 연구는 감사과정에서 감사위험이 높을 때 적정 감사시간을 초과하는 감사시간을 투입함으로써 이익조정을 감소시킬 수 있음을 제시하였다는 점에서 선행연구와 차별된다고 할 수 있다. 또한 Big 감사인이라고 해서 무조건 감사보수를 과다하게 청구하는 것이 아니라 초과감사시간을 보상받기 위해서 감사보수를 더 많이 청구하고 있음을 제시하였다는 점에서 의의를 찾을 수 있다.

영어초록

This study considers not only whether having an auditor that is Big 4-affiliated affects earnings management, but also whether audit hours and audit fees can affect earnings management. In this setting, discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management, audit hours as a proxy for audit efforts and audit fees as a measure of auditors’ economic incentives are endogenously determined. Thus, we employ a structural equation model to take into account the endogeneity of variables under study.
Prior studies in the literature of audit quality show that Big audit firms have higher audit fees and audit hours than non-Big audit firms and argue that this is consistent with the explanation that Big audit firms have higher audit quality. However, this may not be true if Big audit firms spend more audit hours, which result in higher audit fees, because their clients are large in size or if they are susceptible to greater litigation risk than non-Big audit firms. Furthermore, it is not clear whether more audit hours and fees fetch higher audit quality.
Prior studies also separately consider that Big audit firms have higher audit quality than non-Big audit firms based on the result that Big audit firms have smaller discretionary accruals than non-Big audit firms. However, these studies do not control audit hours so that it is difficult to tell whether the result is due to Big auditors' ability to provide high audit quality or their increased efforts to reduce high litigation risk.
This study examines the effect of Big audit firms on earnings management after controlling audit hours and audit fees. If Big audit firms continue to deter earnings management even after including control variables, then Big audit firms may be viewed as providing an audit ability superior to non-Big audit firms. In addition, this study investigates whether audit hours and audit fees play a role in reducing earnings management.
Empirical results show that auditor size and audit hours are highly correlated, but auditor size and abnormal audit hours are not related to each other. This shows that even Big audit firms do not necessarily spend more than the standard number of audit hours. In addition, Big audit firms charge higher audit fees in compensation for additional audit hours in excess of the standard hours, rather than just charging audit fees merely because they are Big audit firms per se. Finally, we find that there is no statistically significant relation between audit hours and discretionary accruals. However, we do find a negative relation between abnormal audit hours and discretionary accruals. This is consistent with the explanation that earnings management is deterred when an auditor makes efforts over and above the standard audit hours required.
This study makes three contributions to the literature of audit quality. First, this is the first to explicitly consider audit hours and audit fees in examining their effect on earnings management. Second, this study employs the structural equation to examine the relation between audit hours, audit fees and auditor reputation. This approach allows us to estimate both direct and indirect effects of study variables. Third, this paper differs from prior studies in that this study provides empirical evidence that audit hours in excess of the standard hours in the presence of high audit risk can reduce the extent of earnings management. Furthermore, high compensation for audit is related to audit firms' additional efforts, rather than auditors’ mere premium for their brand reputation.

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